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DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken 
(a) An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, 
or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. . . . 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT TIMELY FILED HIS 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RELATIVE 
TO THE ORDER ENTERED 
JANUARY 14, 1993 
In her brief, Plaintiff Helen Schumann Broadbent ("Ms. 
Broadbent") first argues that Defendant Ross Broadbent ("Mr. 
Broadbent") did not timely file his notice of appeal relative to 
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the order of the trial court entered January 14, 1993 (the 
"January 1993 Order"), 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in 
relevant part: 
An appeal may be taken from a district, juvenile, 
or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise 
provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal 
with the clerk of the trial court within the time 
allowed by Rule 4. 
Utah R. App. Pro, 3(a) (emphasis added). The final order or 
judgment provision of Rule 3 "precludes a party from taking an 
appeal from any orders or judgments that are not final" except 
when the order or judgment in question is eligible for 
certification under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or the 
appellate court grants permission for an interlocutory appeal, 
A, J, Mackay Co, v. Okland Const, Co,, 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 
1991). Ms, Broadbent did not request certification of the 
January 1993 Order. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 
538 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy 
between the parties litigant. . . . [A] judgment 
which disposes of fewer than all of the causes of 
action alleged in the plaintifffs complaint is 
not a final judgment from which an appeal may be 
taken. 
Id. at 539 (citations omitted). 
In this case, it is clear that the January 1993 Order was 
not a final order. Numerous issues had still not been 
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completely resolved at the time of the entry of the January 1993 
Order. For example, the central issue of the case, the amount 
allegedly owed by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent for support 
arrearages, had not been adjudicated. After the January 1993 
Order was entered, the trial court set an evidentiary hearing for 
the express purpose of determining the amount, if any, owed by 
Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent under the Decree of Divorce. R. 
317-332. The trial court held that evidentiary hearing in 
February and March 1993. R. 1184-1416. On June 28, 1993, the 
trial court ended the controversy between the parties by entering 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the Court 
(the "June 1993 Order") and its Judgment (the "June 1993 
Judgment"). R. 697-706, 716-717. The June 1993 Order and June 
1993 Judgment constitute the final order and judgment in this 
case. On July 9, 1993, Mr. Broadbent timely filed his notice of 
appeal. 
In conclusion, Mr. Broadbent timely filed his notice of 
appeal. Properly before this Court on appeal are the rulings of 
the trial court contained in the January 1993 Order, the June 
1993 Order and the June 1993 Judgment. 
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II. 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS AN 
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT AS IT RELATES TO 
ALIMONY AND, AS IT RELATES TO CHILD 
SUPPORT, TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT 
OR VALUE DERIVED BY MS. BROADBENT 
In Point II of her brief, Ms. Broadbent cites, as did Mr, 
Broadbent, several Utah cases for the proposition of law that a 
child's right to support cannot be bartered away, estopped or 
defeated by the parties. However, Ms. Broadbent completely 
ignores and cites no case in opposition to the cases of Baggs v. 
Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974) and French v. Johnson, 401 
P. 2d 315 (Utah 1965), in which the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized that there are circumstances where a party may be 
estopped from collecting child support. Mr. Broadbent is not 
attempting to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement as 
its relates to his child support obligation. Mr. Broadbent is, 
however, entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on the benefit 
derived by Ms. Broadbent under the Settlement Agreement, which 
amount should be credited against Mr. Broadbent's child support 
obligation. The trial court denied Mr. Broadbent that 
evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Broadbent also completely ignores and cites no case in 
opposition to the case of Gulley v. Gulley, 570 P. 2d 127 (Utah 
1977), in which the Utah Supreme Court has recognized the right 
of former spouses to bargain, compromise and settle alimony 
obligations. Id. at 128. Ms. Broadbent cites the case of Baggs 
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v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), for the proposition that 
the Settlement Agreement provided no new consideration, Baggs 
is, however, inapposite in that it dealt only with child support 
obligations, not alimony. Under Gulley, the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement constituted adequate consideration for the 
compromise, settlement and satisfaction of Mr. Broadbent's 
alimony obligations under the Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, 
the Settlement Agreement should be enforced to that extent. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PRECLUDED 
MR. BROADBENT FROM PRESENTING 
EVIDENCE AS TO HIS PERFORMANCE 
UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
AND THE BENEFIT DERIVED BY 
MS. BROADBENT THEREUNDER 
Ms. Broadbent next argues that Mr. Broadbent was not denied 
an opportunity to present evidence regarding the payment of his 
alimony and child support obligations. Ms. Broadbent is correct 
in her argument to the extent a hearing was conducted to 
determine the amount of cash paid by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. 
Broadbent toward those obligations. Ms. Broadbent is incorrect, 
however, in her assertion to the extent a hearing was conducted 
to determine the in-kind benefits derived by Ms. Broadbent under 
the Settlement Agreement. Equity mandates that Mr. Broadbent be 
given credit against his alimony and child support obligations 
for such in-kind benefits derived by Ms. Broadbent. 
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On November 23, 1992, the trial court heard argument on Mr. 
Broadbent's objection to a writ of garnishment that had been 
issued. R. 1168-1183. In the hearing, the trial court 
established the procedure to decide the legal issue of the 
enforceability of the Settlement Agreement. In that hearing the 
trial court stated: 
THE COURT: I agree. Ms. Douglas, we can't 
proceed in this fashion today. All anybody 
had coming here to court today was a request 
for hearing saying judgment hadn't been 
satisfied, and certainly counsel can't be 
prepared to respond to proffer today. 
Assuming that this settlement stipulation is 
otherwise enforceable, it sounds to me like 
you've got a question of fact that is going 
to require a hearing. 
MS. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, for the court's 
clarification, the $13,000 that I was noting 
to the Court, because that figure was stated 
in the writ of garnishment and there was a 
statement by Mr. Thompson that we were 
attempting to collect some judgments that he 
was not, that we were attempting to stop 
garnishment on a post 1987 judgment, and 
that's the issue I was attempting to 
address. 
THE COURT: Well, it still sounds to me like 
-- assuming that this settlement agreement 
is legally enforceable, that there is a --
at least the plaintiff is entitled to notice 
before we get to the hearing what your 
address is going to be so they can respond 
to it. I really don't think there's any 
alternative but to schedule a hearing. But 
before we do that, Counsel, I'm going to 
require that you brief the legal aspect and 
I would be interested in the Social Services 
vs. Adams. If it's contrary to what the 
Supreme Court has said maybe later in time -
but if it's different than what the 
Supreme Court has said it's valueless as far 
as I'm concerned. The Supreme Court is 
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still the highest court in the State, so we 
need to take a look at the legal issue. 
So, here's the way I propose we handle 
this. The agreement's in the file and some 
legal reason to enforce it, so we'll take as 
a given everybody signing this because 
there's no dispute as to that. The 
settlement agreement was filed in court 
April 18th, 1990. And let me ask the 
plaintiff to file your opening legal 
memoranda with regard to the enforceability 
or lack thereof, to raise any issues as 
you've talked about, that is, it's invalid 
as against public policy, lack of 
consideration, failure of consideration. 
Ms. Douglas, you can respond and then 
I'll give the plaintiff an opportunity to 
reply. If I'm satisfied that the contract, 
after I read the memoranda, is legally 
enforceable and that it doesn't fail for 
lack of consideration as a matter of law, 
that it's precisely the same obligations 
that were upon the divorce decree, if it's 
just a reaffirmation of what was agreed to 
do, what he was told to do earlier in the 
divorce decree, then there's no 
consideration. But assuming those two 
issues aren't positive, then, if, based upon 
the affidavits you filed in support of your 
respective positions on the consideration 
failure thereof, I'll schedule the matter 
for an evidentiary hearing and you can put 
on whatever testimony is appropriate as to 
whether or not the agreement has been 
complied with. 
R. 1177-1179 (emphasis added). 
Based on the memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties, 
on December 30, 1992, the trial court entered its Minute Entry 
and found that Mr. Broadbent's objection to the issuance of the 
writs of garnishment was without merit on the grounds that the 
Settlement Agreement was "invalid and without any legitimate 
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consideration" and that the "Settlement Agreement did not result 
in a court order, and this Court has not authorized the 
substitution of vending machines for child support, even if the 
parties otherwise legitimately agree[d]." R. 183-185. Pursuant 
to the Minute Entry, the trial court entered the January 1993 
Order. Finding of fact no. 5 of the January 1993 Order 
specifically provides that "Plaintiff received no benefit under 
the Settlement Agreement." R. 233. There was and is, however, 
absolutely no evidence in the record supporting that finding. 
Subsequently, Mr. Broadbent was prohibited from presenting 
evidence to challenge that finding. 
In at least three subsequent hearings the trial court stated 
that it would not take evidence relative to the Settlement 
Agreement. In a hearing on January 25, 1993, the trial court 
stated: 
THE COURT: Well, procedurally, I think the 
defendant is correct, the amount of the 
judgment pursuant to the hearing that was 
held earlier, was not pursuant to an 
evidentiary hearing where witnesses were 
called and cross-examination was had. And 
when the amount is calculated as it is here, 
as to the amount of arrearage, then that's a 
legitimate request. This matter was not 
scheduled for an evidentiary hearing today. 
Wasn't scheduled for an evidentiary hearing 
before. If we have to have an evidentiary 
hearing, then we will. Maybe it will come 
out the same way, but in any event it still 
has to be an evidentiary hearing so I can 
consider all the evidence from both sides. 
But that does not mean, however, that I am 
going to revisit the issues of whether or 
not this purported stipulation between the 
parties as to the child support and other 
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things are all contrary to the divorce 
decree. It is not. 1 have decided that 
issue. So what 1 am going to do, 1 am going 
to set the matter for an evidence hearing on 
the issue of the amount of the judgment upon 
which the executions have issued. I will 
not void or vacate the executions because 1 
have not yet vacated or voided judgment, and 
the amount, as to its effect. I will not 
consider any evidence. 1 have made my 
decision with regard to whether or not the 
stipulation between the parties is 
enforceable and it is not. If someone 
doesnft like that, they can appeal it. The 
long and short of it is I think the 
defendant ought to be given an opportunity 
to cross-examine and present evidence. 
Might be appropriate in regard to the amount 
of arrearages that are due. We will conduct 
an evidentiary hearing on that limited scope 
only. 
R. (emphasis added).1 
Similarly in the hearing of February 8, 1993, the trial 
court stated: 
THE COURT: Let me see. The order that was 
prepared, and I assume there was no 
objections — I didn't see one -- I have not 
yet signed this order that Ms. Douglas 
prepared. It says both parties are ordered 
to appear before this Court today for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the amount 
of judgment which the plaintiff should be 
entitled to. I just said we wouldn't re-
visit the issue as to whether the parties 
had an enforceable stipulation. I?ve 
already decided that. 
R. 1187-1188. 
xAs of the date Mr. Broadbent filed his reply brief, the 
transcript of the hearing of January 25, 1993, had not been 
included in the record. Counsel for Mr. Broadbent has made 
arrangements with the clerk of the trial court to correct this 
oversight. The quoted portion is found at pages 11 and 12 of the 
transcript. 
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Finally, in the hearing of March 8, 1993, the trial court 
stated: 
MS. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, in my judgment, 
the Court would have to go back to the Brown 
decision which states that if the parties 
executed a stipulation, and submitted it to 
the Court --
THE COURT: I've already ruled that's 
insufficient. If you don't like that, 
appeal me. 
THE COURT: I'll hang on to it. I want your 
final papers by five o'clock on Wednesday. 
If I don't get them by five o'clock on 
Wednesday, I won't consider them. All I 
want to see from you in writing is a brief 
statement as to what you believe, for 
example, what the plaintiff believes she's 
entitled to, and what documents support, and 
I want included in there, I'm looking at 
final figures. I want what you claim in the 
way of judgment, what's been satisfied, what 
hasn't, and as far as the defendant's 
concerned, all I want to see is what credits 
he thinks he's entitled to. I don't want 
the issue of the stipulation litigated 
again, hashed around again. I didn't accept 
the stipulation. It wasn't my stipulation, 
and I don't accept it. And I've already 
ruled on it. I want to see those Wednesday 
at five. I'll look for them then. We'll be 
in recess. 
R. at 156-158. 
The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the Settlement 
Agreement was "invalid." In three subsequent hearings, the trial 
court prohibited Mr. Broadbent from presenting any evidence on 
the benefit derived by Ms. Broadbent under the Settlement 
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Agreement, which benefit should be credited against Mr. 
Broadbentfs child support and alimony obligations. 
In her brief, Ms. Broadbent also makes the ludicrous 
assertion that "Appellant decided not to present any such 
evidence when he saw on the Exhibit List that Appellee was 
prepared to expose his 'payment in the form of vending machines' 
defense as a hoax." Appellee's Brief at 14-15. To begin with, 
the exhibit list is maintained by the clerk of the trial court 
and neither Mr. Broadbent nor his trial counsel saw the exhibit 
list. Neither Mr. Broadbent nor his trial counsel had knowledge 
of the exhibits Ms. Broadbent planned to introduce into evidence. 
Finally, the exhibits referred to by Ms. Broadbent are not even 
part of the record in this case. As indicated, Ms. Broadbent's 
assertion is ludicrous. 
In summary, the prohibition of the trial court to allow a 
full evidentiary hearing on the benefit derived by Ms. Broadbent 
under the Settlement Agreement constitutes a clear denial of Mr. 
Broadbent's due process rights. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED 
IN NUMEROUS RESPECTS RELATIVE 
TO THE ENTRY OF THE JUNE 1993 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT. 
In Point IV of her brief, Ms. Broadbent first argues that 
Mr. Broadbent is seeking a trial de novo relative to the 
"augmentation" of the 1987 Judgment. Such is not the case. Mr. 
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Broadbent is merely attempting to correct the facial errors in 
the January 1993 Order relative to such items as the compounding 
of interest, the miscalculation of interest and the awarding of 
costs. 
Ms. Broadbent next argues that "the Trial Court was free to 
exercise its discretion under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-
56 in awarding attorney's fees in this case. Brief of Appellee 
at 16. No claim was ever made by Ms. Broadbent for an award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to that statutory section and, indeed, 
the trial court made no findings required for such an award. See 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Finally, Ms. Broadbent asserts that "Appellant engages in 
whining over amounts awarded by the Trial Court and again seeks 
trial de novo" relative to certain reimbursement claims. Brief 
of Appellee at 18. Ms. Broadbent then argues that the "Trial 
Court properly found that 'books, flags, school pictures, flash 
cards, overdue book fees, magazine subscriptions, crafts and 
clothing' were indeed, expenses related to lessons and summer 
school." Id. The same trial court judge concluded in the same 
case a few months later that such expenditures were not subject 
to reimbursement by Mr. Broadbent to Ms. Broadbent under the 
Decree of Divorce. One of the two decisions must be in error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the January 1993 Order, the June 
1993 Order and the June 1993 Judgment should be reversed and 
remanded to the trial court for further evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this /J/% day of August 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
CLARK W. S E S S I O N S 7 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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On this day of August 1994, I hereby caused to be 
mailed via first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following: 
James L. Thompson, Esq , 
2470 S o u t h Redwood Road 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utafti 84119 
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